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CIVIL UNIONS UNDER THE MARYLAND ERA: HOW THE 
ILLUSION OF EQUALITY IS AN EQUAL RIGHTS A VOIDANCE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Activism to gain nationwide legal recogmhon and protection of 
new civil rights often begins on the state level, as America's system 
of federalism means that individual states may provide more civil 
rights to their citizens than do other states or the federal government. 1 
In the 1970s, women's rights activists sought to add an Equal Rights 
Amendment (ERA) to the federal Constitution in order to provide 
stronger constitutional protections against sex discrimination.2 While 
there was not enough support nationwide to pass the amendment, 3 
fourteen states, including Maryland in 1972,4 added ERAs to their 
state constitutions in the 1970s and 1980s. 5 
Today, the movement to create a new civil right to same-sex 
marriage has begun on the state level, and plaintiffs in several states 
have sought to use these ERAs to argue that statutory bans on 
same-sex marriage are unconstitutional sex discrimination. 6 This 
1. See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 8 (1995); see also William J. Brennan, Jr., State 
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 
(1977) ("The legal revolution which has brought federal law to the fore must not be 
allowed to inhibit the independent protective force of state law-for without it, the 
full realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed."). But cf Paul Finkelman, 
Federalism: The Double-Edged Sword of Liberty and Oppression, in AWAKENING 
FROM THE DREAM: CiVIL RIGHTS UNDER SIEGE AND THE NEW STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL 
JUSTICE 3, 3 (Denise C. Morgan et al. eds., 2006) (discussing the idea of federalism as 
having "progressive potential," and finding that while it does allow states to 
"experiment with new ideas and policies that could enhance human freedom," history 
has shown that the Supreme Court will often undermine this potential through its 
reading of the Constitution). 
2. See JANET K. BOLES, THE POLITICS OF THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT I ( 1979) ("The 
basic principle on which the amendment rests is that gender should not be a factor in 
determining the legal rights of either men or women."). 
3. Linda J. Wharton, State Equal Rights Amendments Revisited: Evaluating Their 
Effectiveness in Advancing Protection Against Sex Discrimination, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 
1201, 1202 & n.7 (2005). 
4. Mo. CONST., Declaration of Rights, art. 46 ("Equality of rights under the law shall not 
be abridged or denied because of sex."). 
5. Wharton, supra note 3, at 120 I & n.l. 
6. See Deborah A. Widiss et al., Exposing Sex Stereotypes in Recent Same-Sex Marriage 
Jurisprudence, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER461, 461 n.l (2007). 
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argument has been largely unsuccessful, 7 and, for better or worse, the 
majority of the states that are changing their laws to recognize new 
rights for same-sex partners have largely taken to the idea that civil 
unions are an adequate substitute for same-sex marriage. 8 Civil 
unions, created in Vermont in 2000, 9 grant same-sex couples the 
rights and benefits of marriage under state law. 10 While many gay 
rights activists find this alternative akin to "separate-but-equal,"" 
others have found that it may be a necessary step on the path to 
achieving full marriage rights for gays and lesbians. 12 
Maryland is one of the latest states to weigh in on the same-sex 
marriage issue. In Conaway v. Deane, 13 the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland found that a Maryland statute 14 denying the right to 
7. !d. at 461-62. While this argument has been advanced in eleven states, only one state, 
Hawaii, has thus far found that bans on same-sex marriage constitute sex 
discrimination. !d. 
8. See NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE 97 (2008). Six 
states provide same-sex couples with a different status similar to marriage. !d. 
Vermont, New Jersey, Connecticut, and New Hampshire call this status a civil union, 
while California and Oregon call it a domestic partnership. !d. at 94. In addition, 
Hawaii, Maine, Washington, and the District of Columbia provide limited legal 
benefits to same-sex couples. !d. Massachusetts was the only state to allow same-sex 
marriage until May 15, 2008, when the Supreme Court of California held that 
same-sex marriage was a constitutional right under the state constitution. The Guys 
Next Door, ECONOMIST, May 24, 2008, at 43, 43. While the court's decision in 
California is too new to predict its ultimate outcome, the same-sex marriage laws in 
California may be even more expansive than those in Massachusetts, as California 
plans to marry couples from other states. !d. 
9. See POLIKOFF, supra note 8, at 92; see also Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 
1999) (mandating that the legislature provide same-sex couples with the same 
statutory benefits and protections afforded heterosexual couples, but allowing the 
legislature to create "a parallel 'domestic partnership' system or some equivalent 
statutory alternative"). 
10. See Sean Cahill, The Symbolic Centrality of Gay Marriage in the 2004 Presidential 
Election, in THE FUTURE OF GAY RIGHTS IN AMERICA 47, 62 (H.N. Hirsch ed., 2005) 
("[Civil unions] offer no federal protections and are not portable to other states .... "). 
11. See, e.g., MICHAEL MELLO, LEGALIZING GAY MARRIAGE 142 (2004) (likening 
Vermont's civil unions statute to the separate-but-equal Jim Crow laws). 
12. See, e.g., Greg Johnson, Civil Union, a Reappraisal, 30 VT. L. REv. 891, 894 (2006). 
In arguing that civil unions are a viable alternative to marriage, and that they can 
"provide immediate relief while the battle for same-sex marriage continues," Johnson 
contends that civil unions provide "all the rights, benefits, and responsibilities of 
marriage ... [and treat] same-sex couples as if they were married in every respect, 
from inception to dissolution, withholding only the word 'marriage' itself." !d. at 
891, 894. 
13. 401 Md. 219, 932 A.2d 571 (2007). 
14. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw§ 2-201 (LexisNexis 2006) ("Only a marriage between a 
man and a woman is valid in this State."). 
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marriage to same-sex couples does not discriminate on the basis of 
sex in violation of Maryland's ERA. 15 In so ruling, the court found 
that the Maryland legislature, rather than the judicial system, has the 
authority to grant Maryland residents the right to same-sex marriage 
or civil unions. 16 Implied in the court's holding is the premise that 
civil unions do not violate the ERA and are a constitutional 
alternative to same-sex marriage. 17 
Since the Maryland judicial system absolved itself of any 
responsibility in recognizing a right to same-sex marriage, the 
decision of whether to overturn the statute is now left with the 
legislators, many of whom do not want to vote for same-sex marriage 
if it may jeopardize their chances of re-election. 18 As some 
lawmakers fear that public opinion is largely against same-sex 
marriage, 19 they are taking to the idea of civil unions as a less 
controversial substitute. 20 Indeed, public opinion in Maryland is 
more in favor of civil unions. 21 A recent Washington Post poll found 
that 57% of Maryland residents supported civil unions, while only 
39% opposed them. 22 Forty-four percent of Maryland residents were 
in favor of same-sex marriage, while 51% were opposed. 23 This poll 
shows increasing public support for providing same-sex couples with 
the rights and benefits of marriage, where four years ago, only 44% 
of Marylanders were in favor of civil unions. 24 
This Comment will begin by explaining the key differences in how 
the Conaway majority and dissenting judges interpreted the ERA and 
15. Conaway, 401 Md. at 325,932 A.2d at 635. 
16. !d. ("[O]ur opinion should by no means be read to imply that the General Assembly 
may not grant and recognize for homosexual persons civil unions or the right to marry 
a person of the same sex."). 
17. See id. 
18. See Alan Brody, Same-Sex Marriage Will Be Battle for Democrats, THE GAZETTE 
(Md.), Dec. 14, 2007, at AI. 
19. !d. ("For a law like that to move forward, there needs to be a strong body of public 
opinion, and I don't think it's there yet in a state of moderate temperament like 
Maryland." (quoting Maryland Senate President Thomas V. Mike Miller, Jr.)). 
20. See Lisa Rein, Bills Pursued to Gain Rights Piece by Piece, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 2008, 
at Cl2 ("Gov. Martin O'Malley (D), who has kept a low profile on the matter, 
supports civil unions ... but not same-sex marriage."). 
21. John Wagner & Jon Cohen, Marylanders Lean Left on Gay Marriage, Death Penalty, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 26,2007, at Bl. 
22. !d. In comparison, a national poll found that 45% of Americans supported civil 
unions, while 48% opposed them. !d. 
23. !d. 
24. !d. 
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applied it to same-sex marriage. 25 Part III will look at how other 
courts have interpreted their state constitutions to allow civil unions 
in lieu of same-sex marriage. It will also examine the possible 
consequences of allowing civil unions rather than same-sex marriage 
in Maryland. 26 Finally, Part IV will argue that the Conaway majority 
incorrectly interpreted the applicability of the ERA to same-sex 
marriage. It will further explain why there is no constitutional basis 
to create a separate civil union status for same-sex couples. 27 
II. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE UNDER THE ERA 
In the 1970s, debates over the proposed federal ERA concerned the 
possibility that the amendment could potentially require same-sex 
marriage, 28 and ERA opponents used the public's uneasiness with 
this possibility to sway public opinion against the amendment. 29 
While some ERA supporters acknowledged the ERA could be used to 
eliminate the different-sex requirement for marriage, others thought it 
better to downplay this argument. 30 
There are two parts to the argument that restricting marriage to 
opposite-sex couples is sex discrimination. 31 The first part, which 
has been emphasized most often in marriage equality cases/2 is that 
bans on same-sex marriage discriminate on their face "by restricting 
an individual's right to marry his or her chosen spouse purely on the 
basis of gender."33 The second part is a sex stereotype argument, 
which asserts that denying same-sex couples the right to marry "relies 
upon and perpetuates a system under which men and women occupy 
25. See infra Part II.A.l-2. 
26. See infra Part III.B.2. 
27. See infra Part IV.B. 
28. Widiss et al., supra note 6, at 465-66. Phyllis Schlafy, a leading opponent of the 
ERA, was concerned that the ERA could mandate same-sex marriage because "[i]t is 
precisely 'on account of sex' that a state now denies a marriage license to a man and a 
man, or to a woman and a woman." !d. at 466 (quoting PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY, THE 
POWER OF THE POSITIVE WOMAN 90 (1977)). 
29. !d. at 463 ("[T]he amendment's opponents consciously used public discomfort with 
the concept of marriage by same-sex couples to undermine support for constitutional 
guarantees of sex equality."). 
30. !d. at 466-67. While there were ERA proponents in Washington State who, "well 
aware of the volatility of the issue, went to lengths to disclaim the possibility that 
ratification of the ERA would require permitting same-sex couples to marry," there 
were other ERA advocates who argued that a benefit of the ERA was that it would 
require same-sex marriage. !d. 
31. !d. at 468. 
32. !d. at 469 ("Many litigants have chosen to emphasize the facial sex discrimination 
argument, shying away from more controversial subordination themes."). 
33. !d. 
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different marriage and family roles: men must 'act like husbands' and 
women must 'act like wives. "'34 This argument seeks to promote 
liberty interests by "prohibiting government enforcement of sex roles 
that limit the freedom of individual women and men to depart from 
traditional gender roles in choosing their own life paths."35 
Most plaintiffs in same-sex marriage cases have tended to either 
separate the two arguments or rely only on the facial sex 
discrimination argument, 36 and the courts have largely rejected the 
sex discrimination argument on the ground that same-sex marriage 
bans apply equally to men and women. 37 In contrast, the dissenters in 
these cases have often intertwined both the facial discrimination and 
sex stereotype parts of the argument in finding that ERAs protect 
same-sex marriage. 38 In Conaway, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
disagreed with the sex discrimination argument. 39 
A. Conaway v. Deane 
Upon the plaintiffs' lawsuit alleging that Maryland Code, Family 
Law Article, section 2-201 (Family Law § 2-201) unconstitutionally 
bans same-sex couples from marriage, 40 the Circuit Court for 
Baltimore City declared that the statute discriminated facially on the 
basis of sex, in violation of the ERA. 41 The court held that "the 
exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage constitutes a sex-based 
classification, lacking a constitutionally sufficient justification."42 
The circuit court stayed enforcement of the ruling pending the 
resolution of the case upon appeal, and the case went directly to the 
34. /d. ("The sex stereotype argument may be understood as vindicating anti-
subordination values, on the view that sex stereotypes implicated by the marriage 
statute are harmful because they perpetuate a patriarchal view of marriage and family 
that presumes a breadwinner, head-of-household husband/father and a caretaker, 
subordinate wife/mother."). 
35. /d. 
36. /d. at 470. 
37. /d. at 472 (noting that while majorities have generally used this argument to uphold 
same-sex marriage bans, they have generally dismissed the sex stereotype argument 
separately or have not even addressed it). 
38. See id. at 477. 
39. Conaway v. Deane, 401 Md. 219, 325, 932 A.2d 571, 635 (2007). 
40. /d. at 240-41, 932 A.2d at 583. The plaintiffs included nine same-sex couples who 
were denied marriage licenses and one homosexual male who wished to eventually 
apply for a marriage license. /d. at 238-39, 932 A.2d at 582. 
41. /d. at 237, 932 A.2d at 581. 
42. /d. at 242, 932 A.2d at 584. 
310 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 38 
Court of Appeals ofMaryland. 43 The plaintiffs' four count complaint 
alleged that Family Law § 2-201 was sex discrimination in violation 
of the ERA and discrimination in violation of the equal protection 
and due process guarantees of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration 
ofRights. 44 
1. Majority's View on the Applicability of the ERA to Family Law 
§ 2-201 
The plaintiffs argued that Family Law § 2-201 violates the ERA 
because it "draws an impermissible classification on the basis of sex" 
as it "makes sex a factor in the enjoyment and the determination of 
one's right to marry."45 In rejecting this argument, the court began 
by looking at the legislative intent of the ERA, and found "that the 
intended scope of [the ERA] was to prevent discrimination between 
men and women as classes."46 The court then looked to Maryland 
precedent interpreting the ERA, and found that these cases indicated 
the ERA's "primary purpose was to remedy the long history of 
subordination of women in this country, and to place men and women 
on equal ground as pertains to the enjoyment of basic legal rights 
under the law."47 
a. Benefit/burden analysis 
Burning Tree Club, Inc. v. Bainum (Burning Tree 1)48 was the first 
case relied upon by the majority, 49 and was also the primary cause of 
contention between the majority and the dissent's interpretation of 
the case law construing the ERA. 50 Burning Tree I concerned the 
constitutionality, on ERA grounds, of a Maryland statute that 
afforded tax deferments to private country clubs that agreed to 
preserve their open spaces. 51 The statute included an 
antidiscrimination provision which said that clubs could not qualify 
for the tax benefit if they practiced any form of discrimination, unless 
43. !d. 
44. Id. at 240-41, 932 A.2d at 583. 
45. Id. at 244-45, 932 A.2d at 585-86. 
46. Id. at 246-48, 932 A.2d at 587. Because the court was unable to find any fonnal 
legislative docwnents indicating the legislature's intent, it used extrinsic sources such 
as a post-amendment study, newspaper accounts, and the legislative history of the 
proposed federal ERA. Id. at 247-254, 932 A.2d at 587-591. 
4 7. !d. at 254, 932 A.2d at 591. 
48. 305 Md. 53, 501 A.2d 817 (1985). 
49. Conaway, 401 Md. at 254, 932 A.2d at 591. 
50. !d. at 356-57, 932 A.2d at 654-55 (Battaglia, J., dissenting). 
51. Burning Tree I, 305 Md. at 56, 50 I A.2d at 818. 
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the club was operated with the primary purpose of serving members 
of a particular sex. 52 A majority of the court held that the primary 
purpose provision violated the ERA. 53 
There were three main issues before the court in Burning Tree I, 54 
and the court's holdings were divided between three separate 
opinions. 55 Judge Rodowsky's concurrence joined Judge Murphy's 
opinion and Judge Eldridge's opinion on different issues. 56 While 
Judge Rodowsky agreed with Judge Murphy's opinion that the 
primary purpose provision was not severable from the sex 
discrimination prohibition, he agreed with Judge Eldridge's opinion 
that the primary purpose provision violated the ERA. 57 
In using only Judge Murphy's opinion, the Conaway majority 
concluded that Burning Tree I stood for the proposition that the ERA 
prohibited sex-based classifications "in the allocation of benefits, 
burdens, rights and responsibilities as between men and women."58 
The court concluded that the proper ERA analysis is whether 
governmental action "imposes a burden on one sex but not the other, 
or grants a benefit to one but not the other."59 This benefit/burden 
analysis was primarily gleaned from Judge Murphy's interpretation 
of case law from both Maryland and other jurisdictions that applied 
the ERA to various statutes. 60 The Conaway majority also included 
similar ERA interpretations given by courts in Washington, New 
York, and Vermont. 61 
b. Men and women as classes, not individuals 
Using this analysis in Conaway, the majority found that Family 
Law§ 2-201 was only subject to rational basis review because it does 
"not separate men and women into discrete classes for the purpose of 
granting to one class of persons benefits at the expense of the other 
52. !d. at 57, 501 A.2d at 819 (citing Mo. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 19(e)(4)(i) (repealed 
1996)). 
53. !d. at 84, 501 A.2d at 832. 
54. !d. at 90, 501 A.2d at 836 (Eldridge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
55. !d. at 55, 85, 88, 501 A.2d at 818, 833, 835. 
56. See id. at 85, 501 A.2d at 833 (Rodowsky, J., concurring). 
57. See id. 
58. Conaway, 401 Md. at 255-56, 932 A.2d at 592 (quoting Burning Tree I, 305 Md. at 
64, 501 A.2d at 823 (emphasis added)). 
59. !d. at 260, 932 A.2d at 596 (quoting Burning Tree I, 305 Md. at 70, 501 A.2d at 825). 
60. See Burning Tree!, 305 Md. at 65-70, 501 A.2d at 823-25. 
61. Conaway, 40! Md. at 265-67, 932 A.2d at 598-99. 
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class. "62 Since men and women are both prohibited equally from 
marrying someone of the same sex, there is no sex discrimination. 63 
In coming to this conclusion, the court also rejected the plaintiffs' 
reliance on Loving v. Virginia, 64 which they used to argue that the 
court should examine how the statute affects each individual seeking 
to marry rather than whether the statute treats one sex differently 
from the otherY In Loving, the U.S. Supreme Court wrote on the 
importance of the freedom to marry,66 and found unconstitutional a 
Virginia statute prohibiting marriage between Caucasians and non-
Caucasians. 67 Despite the statute's equal application to all races, the 
Court found a discriminatory purpose behind the statute. 68 In 
rejecting the plaintiffs' Loving argument, the Conaway majority 
found that the Loving court held the miscegenation statute 
unconstitutional because its discriminatory purpose was to "sustain 
White Supremacy and to subordinate African-Americans and other 
non-Caucasians as a class."69 Since Family Law § 2-201 was not 
intended to have a discriminatory effect on either men or women as a 
class, and was not based on a discriminatory view of gender roles, the 
court held that Loving was an inapplicable analogy. 70 
2. Dissent's View on Applicability of the ERA to Family Law§ 2-
201 
Judge Battaglia's dissenting opinion, which was joined by Judge 
Bell, 71 found that Family Law § 2-201 implicated the ERA and was 
62. !d. at 264, 932 A.2d at 598. Rational basis review is the minimal level of scrutiny that 
a court will apply to a claim that a law violates the right to equal protection or due 
process. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 815 (2d ed. 2005). Under this 
test, "the government's action only has to ... be shown to be rationally related to a 
legitimate government purpose." !d. Heightened scrutiny, or strict scrutiny, is the 
highest level of scrutiny a court may apply, and requires that "the government's action 
[is] necessary to achieve a compelling purpose." !d. 
63. Conaway, 401 Md. at 264, 932 A.2d at 598. 
64. 388 U.S. I (1967). 
65. Conaway, 401 Md. at 267, 932 A.2d at 599. 
66. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 ("The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the 
vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. . . . 
Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry or not marry, a person of another race 
resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State."). 
67. ld. at 2. 
68. !d. at II ("There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious 
racial discrimination which justifies this classification."). 
69. Conaway, 410 Md. at 269, 932 A.2d at 601. 
70. !d. at 270, 932 A.2d at 601-{)2. 
71. !d. at 421, 932 A.2d at 693 (Battaglia, J., dissenting). 
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therefore subject to strict scrutiny, rather than rational basis, review. 72 
The dissent stated that the proper analysis was whether a statute drew 
gender classifications on its face, not whether a statute benefited or 
burdened one sex. 73 In making this finding, the dissent, relying 
primarily on the same Maryland case law as the majority, found a 
largely different ERA construction within these cases. 74 In addition, 
the dissent concluded these cases collectively indicated that "the 
ERA is intended to address the rights of individuals, not the rights of 
'men and women as classes. "'75 
a. Sex-based classification analysis 
The Conaway dissent's main issue with the majority's use of 
Burning Tree I was that the court used Judge Murphy's opinion to 
interpret the ERA. 76 In his own opinion, Judge Murphy wrote, "[a] 
majority of the judges of the Court do not fully share the analysis set 
forth in this opinion and hold that the primary purpose provision is 
unconstitutional under the [ERA] for the various reasons set forth in 
the concurring and dissenting opinions."77 Despite this, the Conaway 
majority's discussion of Burning Tree rs holding on the primary 
purpose provision quoted solely from and acknowledged only Judge 
Murphy's opinion. 78 
Instead, the dissent relied upon Judge Eldridge's majority 
opinion, 79 which rejected the benefit/burden analysis, explaining that 
"[ w ]hile it is true that many of our prior cases have involved 
72. See id. at 358, 932 A.2d at 655 (Battaglia, J., dissenting). 
73. !d. at 357-58, 932 A.2d at 655. 
74. !d. at 399, 932 A.2d at 680. 
Our cases stand for the proposition that all state action that draws 
sex-based distinctions, regardless of whether such action 'directly 
impos[es] a burden or confer[s] a benefit entirely upon either 
males or females,' implicates the ERA and must be subjected to 
strict scrutiny. . . . Until today, this Court has never shied away 
from that standard when applying the ERA. 
!d. (alterations in original) (citation omitted). 
75. !d. at 403, 932 A.2d at 682 (Bell, C.J., dissenting) (quoting majority opinion). 
76. !d. at 356-57, 932 A.2d at 654-55 (stating that the majority erroneously relied on 
Judge Murphy's opinion because it did not reflect the majority of the court's view). 
77. Burning Tree I, 305 Md. at 80, 501 A.2d at 830. Judge Eldridge, after noting that 
Judge Murphy's opinion was not the opinion of the court, warned that if it "were in 
the future to be adopted by a majority of this Court, the effectiveness of the [ERA] to 
the Maryland [c]onstitution would be substantially impaired." !d. at 88, 501 A.2d at 
835 (Eldridge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
78. See Conaway, 401 Md. at 260-64, 932 A.2d at 595-98. 
79. See id. at 356-58; 932 A.2d at 654-55 (Battaglia, J., dissenting). 
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government action directly imposing a burden or conferring a benefit 
entirely upon either males or females, we have never held that the 
[ERA] is narrowly limited to such situations."80 Judge Eldridge also 
advocated a broad interpretation of the ERA, 81 and stated that 
sex-based classifications were subject to the same scrutiny as racial 
classifications. 82 
The dissent then examined Maryland case law which applied 
Burning Tree r s ERA analysis, and found that these cases adopted 
Judge Eldridge's ERA analysis rather than Judge Murphy's 
analysis. 83 Of particular importance to the dissent was State v. 
Burning Tree Club, Inc. (Burning Tree II), 84 which dealt with a 
periodic discrimination provision enacted after the primary purpose 
provision at issue in Burning Tree I was declared unconstitutional. 85 
The Burning Tree II court interpreted Burning Tree I as holding that 
any "enactment of legislation which on its face draws classifications 
based on sex is state action sufficient to invoke the [ERA]."86 
Further, Burning Tree II held that once these sex-based classifications 
were drawn, the court must apply strict scrutiny under the ERA, not 
rational basis. 87 
b. Men and women as individuals, not classes 
The Conaway dissent also disagreed with the majority's assertion 
that the ERA was meant to protect the rights of men and women as 
classes, finding instead that the ERA was meant to protect "the 
individual whose rights are infringed by the sex-based 
classification. "88 In Giffin v. Crane, 89 the Court of Appeals of 
80. Burning Tree I, 305 Md. at 95, 501 A.2d at 838 (Eldridge, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (noting the court's position that sex-based classifications are 
suspect under the ERA, and are therefore subject to stricter scrutiny (citing Md. State 
Bd. of Barber Exam'rs v. Kuhn, 270 Md. 496, 506-07,312 A.2d 216,222 (1973)) and 
noting Judge Murphy's statement that the ERA's language unambiguously requires 
equality of rights and sex cannot be a factor (citing Rand v. Rand, 280 Md. 508, 512, 
374 A.2d 900, 903 (1977))). 
81. !d. 
82. !d. at 98, 501 A.2d at 840. However, Judge Eldridge did believe that some sex-based 
classifications could be justified under strict scrutiny because of "inherent differences 
between the sexes." !d. 
83. See Conaway, 401 Md. at 381-88, 932 A.2d at 669-74 (Battaglia, J., dissenting). 
84. 315 Md. 254,554 A.2d 366 (1989). 
85. !d. at 259-63, 554 A.2d at 369-71. 
86. !d. at 293, 554 A.2d at 386. 
87. !d. at 293-96, 554 A.2d at 386-87. 
88. Conaway, 401 Md. at 402, 932 A.2d at 682 (Battaglia, J., dissenting). 
89. 351 Md. 133,716 A.2d 1029 (1998). 
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Maryland held that a parent's sex was an impermissible factor in the 
granting of child custody. 90 The Giffin court stated that: 
[T]he equality between the sexes demanded by the 
Maryland [ERA] focuses on "rights" of individuals "under 
the law," which encompasses all forms of privileges, 
immunities, benefits and responsibilities of citizens. As to 
these, the Maryland [ERA] absolutely forbids the 
determination of such "rights," as may be accorded by law, 
solely on the basis of one's sex, i.e., sex is an impermissible 
factor in making any such determination. 91 
The Conaway majority focused on the phrase "between the sexes" 
in the first sentence of the above-quoted passage, but left out the 
second sentence in its analysis. 92 The dissent believed that the 
omission of the second sentence was a deliberate misconstruction of 
the passage,93 and argued that this passage, along with other case law 
construing the ERA, meant that "the ERA [was] intended to address 
the rights of individuals. "94 
The dissent also rejected the majority's Loving argument, and 
instead found Loving applicable to Family Law § 2-201. 95 The 
majority found that Loving was inapplicable because Family Law 
§ 2-201 did not have a discriminatory purpose. 96 However, the 
dissent argued that the Loving court "reached its holding 
independently of the issue of discriminatory intent ... 'find[ing] the 
racial classifications . . . repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment, 
even assuming an even-handed state purpose to protect the 
"integrity" of all races. "'97 Further, the dissent argued that the 
90. See id. at 155, 716 A.2d at 1040. 
91. !d. at 149, 716 A.2d at 1037 (citation omitted). 
92. Conaway, 401 Md. at 258, 932 A.2d at 595. 
93. !d. at 403, 932 A.2d at 682 (Battaglia, J., dissenting) ("The majority in the present 
case deliberately misconstrues the passage quoted above through selective quotation, 
conveniently omitting the second sentence, to support its narrowly constrained view 
of the ERA as somehow permitting separate but 'equal' in matters of sex 
discrimination."). 
94. !d. 
95. !d. at 408-09, 932 A.2d at 685-86. 
96. I d. at 270, 932 A.2d at 602. 
97. !d. at 408, 932 A.2d at 685 (Battaglia, J., dissenting) (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U.S. 1, 11 n.ll (1967)). 
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underlying intent of Family Law § 2-201 was irrelevant because the 
statute drew sex -based classifications on its face. 98 
III. CIVIL UNIONS 
While finding a rational basis for Maryland's ban on same-sex 
marriage, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that it would 
nevertheless be constitutional for the legislature to allow same-sex 
marriage or civil unions. 99 The court found a rational basis within the 
state's interests in "fostering procreation and encouraging the 
traditional family structure in which children are bom." 100 The court 
explained that, while these interests were reasonably related to the 
exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage, the legislature could 
choose other means of pursuing these interests. 101 Because this 
holding creates the possibility that the legislature may enact civil 
unions instead of same-sex marriage, 102 it is necessary to examine 
their constitutionality and consequences. 103 This Part will first look 
at Vermont's and New Jersey's legal rationales for civil unions. As 
Judge Raker's concurrence in Conaway advocated civil unions, 104 
this Part will then use that opinion as the starting point for a 
discussion of the constitutionality and consequences of civil unions in 
Maryland. 
A. Court Ordered Civil Unions 
Two high courts, those in Vermont 105 and New Jersey, 106 have 
separated the right to marry from the rights of marriage. 107 Both 
courts ruled that while same-sex couples can be banned from 
marriage, they still must be able to receive the rights and benefits of 
marriage. 108 In Baker v. State, 109 the Supreme Court of Vermont 
allowed the legislature to create civil unions after the court held that 
98. /d. at 408-09, 932 A.2d at 685-86 ("[l]t is well-settled that the question of 
discriminatory intent does not arise unless the threshold question of facial neutrality is 
answered in the affirmative."). 
99. /d. at 325, 932 A.2d at 635. 
I 00. /d. 
101. /d. 
102. See id. 
103. See infra Part III.B. 
104. See Conaway, 401 Md. at 326--27, 932 A.2d at 635-36 (Raker, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
I 05. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
106. Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006). 
I 07. Lewis, 908 A.2d at 221; Baker, 744 A.2d at 867. 
108. Lewis, 908 A.2d at 200; Baker, 744 A.2d at 867. 
109. 744 A.2d 864. 
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the Vermont Constitution's Common Benefits Clause required the 
state to provide same-sex couples with the same statutory benefits 
and protections afforded opposite-sex couples. 110 In so holding, the 
court explained that the legislature could choose to include same-sex 
couples "within the marriage laws themselves or a parallel 'domestic 
partnership' system or some equivalent statutory altemative." 111 The 
court came to this conclusion after characterizing the plaintiffs' claim 
as primarily seeking the statutory protections of marriage rather than 
the actual right to marriage. 112 
The plaintiffs in Baker unsuccessfully argued that the ban on 
same-sex marriage was sex discrimination, and the court applied 
rational basis review. 113 The court found that heightened scrutiny 
was unwarranted because the marriage laws were facially neutral and 
did not "single out men or women as a class for disparate 
treatment." 114 The court did not believe that the laws had a 
discriminatory purpose, as there was no evidence "that the authors of 
the marriage laws excluded same-sex couples [from marriage] 
because of incorrect and discriminatory assumptions about gender 
roles or anxiety about gender-role confusion." 115 The court therefore 
did not fmd sex discrimination a "useful analytic framework for 
determining plaintiffs' rights under the Common Benefits Clause." 116 
In Lewis v. Harris, 117 the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that 
the New Jersey Constitution's equal protection requirement meant 
that same-sex couples must receive the rights of marriage. 118 The 
court followed the Baker court's lead in recharacterizing the 
plaintiffs' claims, refusing to take an "ali-or-nothing approach" and 
instead separating the plaintiffs' equal protection claim into two 
rights: the right to marry and the rights of marriage. 119 Similar to 
Vermont, the court gave the legislature the option of allowing 
110. !d. at 867. The court noted that its holding was based only on the Common Benefits 
Clause, not the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution. /d. at 870. It found that the Common Benefits Clause was intended to 
provide "equal access to public benefits and protections for the community as a 
whole." /d. at 876. 
Ill. !d. at 867. 
112. !d. at 886. 




117. 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006). 
118. /d. at 200. 
119. /d. at 206. 
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same-sex marriage or civil unions. 120 The court refused "to alter the 
long accepted definition of marriage," and believed the proper arena 
for such a dramatic social change was through the democratically 
elected members of the legislature. 121 As the court's holding was on 
equal protection grounds, it did not address the plaintiffs' sex 
discrimination argument. 122 
B. The Constitutionality and Consequences of Enacting Civil 
Unions in Maryland 
While civil unions may seem, at first glance, preferable to the 
current statutory scheme as it relates to same-sex couples, they have 
many negative attributes that must be considered. 123 Because the 
pros and cons of civil unions have been well-documented, 124 this 
section will only touch on these general arguments within the larger 
discussion. A more relevant analysis will be Judge Raker's 
concurrence in Conaway, which provided a legal rationale for civil 
unions in Maryland. 125 Because Judge Raker agreed with the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey's legal analysis, and focused on New 
Jersey's civil union statute as a model for Maryland to follow, 126 this 
section will look specifically at the effects of New Jersey's civil 
union laws. 
120. Id. at 221. The court also implicitly rejected the separate but equal argument against 
civil unions: "[W]e will not speculate that identical schemes called by different names 
would create a distinction that would offend [the equal protection guarantee]. We will 
not presume that a difference in name alone is of constitutional magnitude." See id. at 
222. 
121. Id. at 223. 
122. Widiss eta!., supra note 6, at 474 (citing Lewis, 908 A.2d 196). 
123. See infra Part III.B.2 (outlining the negative consequences of civil unions). 
124. See generally EVAN GERSTMANN, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 198-
202 (2d ed. 2008) (criticizing civil unions as a denial of full citizenship); Barbara J. 
Cox, But Why Not Marriage: An Essay on Vermont's Civil Unions Law, Same-Sex 
Marriage, and Separate but (Un)Equal, 25 VT. L. REv. 113, 123-146 (2000) 
(comparing civil unions laws with race and sex discrimination); Joseph F. Emmerth, 
Civil Unions in Illinois: A Cautious Gaze into a Possible Future, 20 DCBA BRIEF: 
THE JOURNAL OF THE DUPAGE COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION, Nov.-Dec. 2007, at 14-20 
(outlining the pros and cons of passing a civil unions act in Illinois); Johnson, supra 
note 12, at 902-08 (arguing in favor of civil unions and other alternatives to 
marriage). 
125. See Conaway v. Deane, 401 Md. 219, 326, 932 A.2d 571, 635-36 (2007) (Raker, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
126. See id. at 326-27, 932 A.2d at 635-36. 
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1. Judge Raker's Argument for Civil Unions 
a. Constitutional basis 
319 
Judge Raker argued that "[ u ]nder the equal protection guarantee of 
Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, the State must 
provide committed same-sex couples, on equal terms, the same 
rights, benefits, and responsibilities enjoyed by married heterosexual 
couples." 127 She agreed with the Supreme Court of New Jersey that 
the rights of marriage should be separated from the right to marry. 128 
In making her argument for civil unions, Judge Raker agreed with the 
Conaway majority that Family Law § 2-201 was only subject to 
rational basis review, 129 but disagreed that it met this standard. 130 The 
majority held that the state's interest in promoting procreation and 
child rearing was rationally furthered by only granting the full rights 
of marriage to opposite-sex couples. 131 Judge Raker found it 
"striking . . . that the State's proffered interest-providing a stable 
environment for procreation and child rearing-is actually 
compromised by denying same-sex families the benefits and rights 
that flow from marriage." 132 This was because any child of same-sex 
parents was denied numerous rights that were received by similarly 
situated children of married opposite-sex parents. 133 Judge Raker 
further argued that the state was arbitrary in its assignment of some 
rights, but not all, to same-sex couples. 134 
127. !d. at 352, 932 A.2d at 651. 
128. !d. at 326, 932 A.2d at 636. 
129. !d. at 329, 932 A.2d at 638. Judge Raker argued that rational basis was the proper 
standard because Family Law § 2-201 did not "discriminate on the basis of sex, 
burden significantly a fundamental right, or otherwise draw a classification based on 
suspect or quasi-suspect criteria." !d. at 328-29, 932 A.2d at 637-38. 
130. !d. at 352, 932 A.2d at 651. Judge Raker found that rational basis review was not met 
because of the denial to same-sex couples of the rights and benefits of marriage, not 
because of the denial of the right to marriage. !d. at 351-52, 932 A.2d at 651. 
131. !d. at 317-18, 932 A.2d at 630-31 (majority opinion) ("[The] 'inextricable link' 
between marriage and procreation reasonably could support the definition of marriage 
as between a man and a woman only, because it is that relationship that is capable of 
producing biological offspring of both members (advances in reproductive 
technologies notwithstanding)."). 
132. !d. at 349, 932 A.2d at 650 (Raker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
133. !d. at 350, 932 A.2d at 650. As an example, Judge Raker believed there was "no 
rational basis for requiring a group life insurance policy to cover a spouse and 
dependent children in a heterosexual family, when children of same-sex couples 
would benefit just as much from life insurance." /d. 
134. /d. at 349, 932 A.2d at 650. 
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b. Civil unions as a remedy 
Upon finding that the means employed by the state did not meet its 
interest in promoting the family, Judge Raker discussed the 
magnitude of the injustice currently imposed upon same-sex couples, 
especially those with children. 135 A civil union statute providing 
same-sex couples with the rights and benefits of marriage would offer 
these couples hundreds of statutory rights that they are currently 
denied. 136 Judge Raker elaborated: 
It is clear that there are significant differences in the benefits 
provided to married couples and same-sex couples in the areas 
of taxation, business regulation, secured commercial 
transactions, spousal privilege and other procedural matters, 
education, estates and trusts, family law, decision-making 
regarding spousal health care, insurance, labor and 
employment, child care and child rearing, pensions, and the 
responsibilities attendant to spousal funeral arrangements. 137 
Some of these rights are especially important for children of 
same-sex couples, an issue with which Judge Raker was particularly 
concerned. 138 Judge Raker's analysis makes clear that civil unions 
have some positive aspects, such as affording hundreds of Maryland 
children rights that they are currently denied solely because of their 
parents' sexual orientation. 139 Despite this, civil unions are 
unconstitutional under the ERA, and the next section will explain 
how marriage is the only truly equal way of providing legal rights to 
same-sex couples. 
135. !d. at 350, 932 A.2d at 650. 
136. See id. at 343, 932 A.2d at 646 ("[Plaintiffs] have directed us to over 425 statutory 
protections that are afforded to married couples and, as a result, to their children under 
state law, protections that [plaintiffs] are denied."); see also Gregory Care, Comment, 
Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed, Something Long Overdue: The 
Evolution of a "Sexual Orientation-Blind" Legal System in Maryland and the 
Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage, 35 U. BALT. L. REv. 73 app. at 103-32 (2005) 
(describing 339 statutory benefits and obligations granted to married couples and their 
children but denied to same-sex couples and their children). 
137. Conaway, 401 Md. at 345-46, 932 A.2d at 648 (Raker, J. concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
138. !d. at 346, 932 A.2d at 648 ("Significantly, the inequities directed to individuals in 
same-sex couples have an impact on their children. [These c]hildren ... are treated 
differently-because their care providers are denied certain benefits and rights-despite 
comparable needs to children of married couples."). 
139. !d. at 343, 345-46, 932 A.2d at 646, 648. 
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2. Consequences of Civil Unions 
a. Effects of New Jersey's civil union statute 
As Judge Raker's analysis largely relied upon New Jersey's 
approach to civil unions, I40 it is important to look not only at the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey's legal rationale for civil unions, but 
also at the effects of this statutory scheme. After the Lewis court 
mandated that the New Jersey legislature amend the statutory scheme 
to allow either same-sex marriage or civil unions, I4I the legislature 
established civil unions and a Civil Union Review Commission, 
which was created to study the effects of the law.I42 Judge Raker 
summarized the commission's duties as "studying the 
implementation of the law, evaluating the effect on same-sex couples, 
their children and other family members of being provided civil 
unions rather than marriage, and reporting its findings to the 
Legislature and Governor on a semi-annual basis."I43 The first report 
by the commission provides numerous reasons that the Maryland 
legislature should consider in deciding to bypass civil unions and 
instead recognize same-sex marriages. I44 
The twelve-member commission, composed of government 
· officials, lawyers, and ministers, held three public hearings in late 
2007, during which they heard testimony from ninety-six people. I45 
The testimony was overwhelmingly against civil unions as an 
adequate substitute for same-sex marriage. I46 The president of the 
New Jersey State Bar Association called civil unions "a failed 
experiment," explaining that the civil union statutory scheme 
"fail[ ed] to afford same-sex couples the same rights and remedies 
provided to heterosexual married couples." I47 
The testimony showed that same-sex couples faced especially 
unequal treatment from their employers. I48 Many employers failed to 
140. Id. at 353-56, 932 A.2d at 652-54 (Raker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
141. Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196,221,224 (N.J. 2006). 
142. See N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 37:1-28(e), Assembly Judiciary Committee's statement (West 
Supp. 2008). 
143. Conaway, 401 Md. at 355, 932 A.2d at 653-54 (Raker, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (citing N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 37:1-36 (West Supp. 2008)). 
144. N.J. CIVIL UNION REVIEW COMM'N, FIRST INTERIM REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY CIVIL 
UNION REVIEW COMMISSION (2008). 
145. Id. at 1-2, 4. 
146. Seeid.at6-7,9-17. 
147. Id. at 4. 
148. Id. at 6-7. 
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recognize civil unions because the employers were covered by the 
Federal Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 
which meant that they were governed by federal law rather than state 
law. 149 Because the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) 
allowed employers the option of not offering equal benefits to civil 
union partners, many employers continued to discriminate against 
same-sex couples. 150 In contrast, the testimony showed that in 
Massachusetts, where the legislature enacted laws allowing same-sex 
marriage rather than civil unions, the vast majority ofERISA-covered 
employers extended benefits to same-sex couples. 151 Furthermore, 
the testimony indicated that the issue was primarily one of semantics, 
as "numerous employers decline[ d] to provide insurance and health 
benefits to civil union partners not because of an objection to the 
government recognition of same-sex couples, but because of the term 
used by statutes establishing government sanctioned, same-sex 
relationships." 152 
Another problem recognized in the report was that the general 
public did not understand civil unions, and thus civil union partners 
had to explain the meaning "repeatedly to employers, doctors, nurses, 
insurers, teachers, soccer coaches, [and] emergency room 
personnel." 153 This was shown to be more than a "mere 
inconvenience," as many witnesses were "denied access and 
decision-making authority to civil union partners, either initially or 
completely, because of a lack of understanding of the rights that flow 
from civil unions." 154 Further, the testimony discussed specific 
problems civil unions presented for gay children, non-Caucasians, 
military families, and transgenders. 155 
149. /d. at 6. 
150. /d. 
[I]n 1996 Congress passed [DOMA], which defined marriage in 
federal law as a 'legal union between one man and one woman,' 
thereby restricting federal benefits, such as Social Security 
survivor benefits, to heterosexual couples. The bills also told 
states they did not have to recognize same-sex marriages should 
another state legalize such marriages. 
Cahill, supra note 10, at 55 (quoting Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-
199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified at I U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738c (2006)). 
151. N.J. CIVIL UNION REVIEWCOMM'N, supra note 144, at 7-9. 
152. /d. at 9. 
153. /d. at I 0 (describing civil unions as "a second-class status"). 
154. !d. at 10-11. 
155. /d. at 11-12, 15-17. 
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b. Potential similar problems in Maryland 
As the previous section illustrates, civil unions do not provide truly 
equal protection to same-sex couples. There is no reason to believe 
that the responses of employers, government officials, school 
authorities, and hospital staff to civil union partnerships would be any 
different in Maryland, as even civil union couples in Vermont 
continue to face problems similar to those in New Jersey. 156 In 
addition to denying some Maryland residents equality under the law, 
civil unions would create unnecessary administrative and financial 
hardships on both public and private institutions because they would 
have to make changes, such as on administrative forms, to conform to 
the new law. 157 By simply bringing same-sex couples into the 
definition of marriage, there would be no need for these institutions 
to change forms or policies. 158 
IV. CIVIL UNIONS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE 
ERA 
Because of the Conaway majority's interpretation of the ERA, civil 
unions are currently a constitutional possibility under Maryland case 
law. 159 However, this Part argues that the Conaway majority 
misinterpreted both the meaning and intent of the ERA and 
subsequent case law construing it. Further, while courts in Vermont 
and New Jersey separated the right to marry from the rights of 
marriage, this court-created distinction cannot be made under the 
Maryland constitution. 160 Because the Conaway dissent's 
interpretation of the ERA was correct, and therefore strict scrutiny 
156. See id. at 5 (discussing testimony that Vermont has established a commission to 
determine whether it should provide full marriage equality to same-sex couples, as 
civil union couples still face problems with the law, even though the civil unions law 
was enacted in 2000); Sarah Liebowitz, Civil Limits in Vermont: Gay Couples Learn 
.That Union Isn't the Same as Marriage, CONCORD MONITOR, May 6, 2007, available 
at 
http://www.concordmonitor.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article? AID=120070506/REPOSITOR 
Y/70506031111002/NEWS02 ("In the seven years since Vermont became the first 
state to create civil unions, couples have uncovered countless ways in which same-sex 
unions differ from heterosexual marriage."). 
157. See N.J. CIVIL UNION REVIEW COMM'N, supra note 144, at 13 ("Several witnesses 
spoke of the lack of a 'married/civil unioned' or 'civil unioned' option on government 
agency forms, leaving civil union couples in a quandary as to which box to check, 
'married' or 'single."'). 
158. See id. 
159. See Conaway v. Deane, 401 Md. 219,325,932 A.2d 571,635 (2007). 
160. See infra Part IV.B. 
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must be applied to a civil union statute that denies the right to 
marriage to same-sex couples, civil unions are sex-based 
discrimination in violation ofthe Maryland ERA. 161 
A. Why Conaway Misinterpreted the ERA 
The Conaway majority based its interpretation of the ERA on the 
ERA's legislative history, Maryland case law construing the ERA's 
meaning, and other jurisdictions' interpretations of their respective 
state ERAs. 162 This section will expand on arguments from the 
Conaway dissent, which correctly criticized the majority's 
interpretation of case law construing the ERA. Since the dissent 
extensively covered the reasons why the majority misconstrued case 
law, 163 this section will only focus on the majority's analysis of the 
ERA's legislative history. 
I. Meaning and Intent of the ERA 
The Conaway majority found that the ERA's "primary purpose ... 
was to eliminate discrimination as between men and women as a 
class." 164 Because the majority could not find any formal legislative 
history on the ERA, in order to determine the legislature's intent, 
they used extrinsic sources such as a post-amendment study, 
newspaper articles, and the legislative history of the proposed federal 
ERA. 165 The Conaway dissent was also unable to provide any 
legislative history on the Maryland ERA, but criticized the majority 
for "attempt[ing] to parse the meaning of the ERA from 
contemporaneous newspaper articles ... [when] we [in prior cases] 
161. See Conaway, 401 Md. at 399-409, 932 A.2d at 680-86 (Battaglia, J., dissenting). 
The dissent applied strict scrutiny, and stated that the case should be remanded for a 
fuller hearing on whether the state could meet its "unrebutted contention regarding the 
broad societal interest in retaining traditional marriage." !d. at 420, 932 A.2d at 693 
(construing Mo. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-201 (LexisNexis 2008)). While the 
dissent did not finalize "an ultimate opinion on whether the [s]tate could meet its 
burden," it provided several reasons why, when considered with the reasons given in 
this Comment, it would be an almost impossible challenge for the state to meet its 
burden on remand. !d. 
162. See id. at 246--67, 932 A.2d at 587-99. 
163. See Conaway, 401 Md. at 358-76, 381-88, 932 A.2d at 655-65, 669-74. As 
discussed earlier in this Comment, the Conaway majority primarily relied upon a 
minority opinion in Burning Tree I for its view that the ERA is implicated only when 
a statute benefits or burdens a sex. See supra Part Il.A.2.a. 
164. Conaway, 401 Md. at 250, 932 A.2d at 589. 
165. !d. at 246-54, 932 A.2d at 587-91. 
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have questioned the legitimacy of so doing." 166 Instead, the dissent 
argued that case law interpreting the ERA immediately following its 
passage was a better source of its meaning. 167 
The majority pointed out that the legislative history of the proposed 
federal ERA contained a statement, by one of its supporters, that the 
ERA would not require same-sex marriage. 168 However, the majority 
failed to mention that many ERA opponents and proponents 
explicitly stated that the ERA would require same-sex marriage. 169 
One senator did not vote for the federal ERA because he was 
"convinced to a moral certainty that [under the ERA] the U.S. 
Supreme Court would have to say that homosexuals could marry." 170 
The possibility that the federal ERA would require same-sex 
marriage was also used by some conservatives as a tool to lower 
support for the ERA. 171 In fact, one conservative's opposition 
movement "explicitly tied the possibility of marriage for same-sex 
couples to 'degradat[ion]' of women's homemaker role and 
traditional gender roles within families." 172 This also demonstrates 
that the denial of marriage to same-sex couples is tied to traditional 
gender roles and sex discrimination. 
The conflicting statements from both sides of the issue indicate that 
the federal ERA's applicability to same-sex marriage was never 
settled in the 1970s, and is not clearly on the Conaway majority's 
side. 173 Either way, "statements from thirty years ago regarding a 
constitutional amendment that was never enacted have no weight in 
determining whether different-sex marriage requirements violate 
modem sex discrimination standards." 174 The ERA rests on the 
166. See id. at 368 n.l4, 932 A.2d at 661 n.l4 (Battaglia, J., dissenting) ("To appreciate the 
weakness of reliance on newspaper articles, consider the fact that an analysis of the 
interpretative methodology of this Court over the period from 1987 to 1994 revealed 
only one case out of sixty-six where this Court even mentioned newspaper accounts in 
the context of statutory interpretation."). 
167. See id. at 367-68, 932 A.2d at 661 (Battaglia, J., dissenting). 
168. /d. at 253-54, 932 A.2d at 591 (majority opinion). 
169. See Widiss et al., supra note 6, at 466-68; see also supra notes 29-31 and 
accompanying text. 
170. Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional 
Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1394 n.209 (2006). 
171. See id. at 1389; see also supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
172. Widiss et al., supra note 6, at 466 (alteration in original). 
173. See id. 
174. /d. at 467 n.28. The Supreme Court held that male-on-male sexual harassment is 
actionable under Title VII, although it 
was assuredly not the principal evil Congress was concerned with 
when it enacted Title VII. But statutory prohibitions often go 
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"basic principle ... that gender should not be a factor in determining 
the legal rights of either men or women." 175 The Conaway majority 
mischaracterized the ERA's intent by leaving out the history that 
indicated it could be used to require same-sex marriage. 176 The 
reality is that, in the 1970s, there were many different views on the 
applicability of the ERA to same-sex marriage. 177 While the full 
meaning and intent of the ERA are somewhat unclear, both sides of 
the debate are in agreement that the amendment was meant to break 
down stereotypical gender roles. 178 Bans on same-sex marriage are 
therefore sex discrimination because they involve sex stereotyping. 179 
Because bans on same-sex marriage are sex discrimination, they 
invoke the ERA, and are therefore subject to strict scrutiny. 180 
B. Constitutionality of Civil Unions in Other States Compared to 
Constitutionality of Civil Unions in Maryland 
Under our system of federalism, individual states may provide 
more state constitutional rights to their citizens than do other states or 
the federal govemment. 181 In making comparisons between 
Maryland's own constitutional imperatives and those of states that 
have enacted civil unions, it is first critical to note that, unlike 
Maryland, neither Vermont nor New Jersey has an ERA. 182 Further, 
beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, 
and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the 
principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed. 
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998). 
175. BOLES, supra note 2, at 1. 
176. See Conaway v. Deane, 401 Md. 219, 424, 932 A.2d 571, 695 (2007) (Bell, C.J., 
dissenting) (citing Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 23 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye, J., 
dissenting)). 
177. See Siegel, supra note 170, at 1401-02 ("In sum, it is painfully plain that, throughout 
the 1970s and into the 1980s, opponents of the ERA had enormous leverage over the 
ways that proponents of the ERA expressed and litigated the meaning of 
discrimination 'on account of sex."'). 
178. See, e.g., Conaway, 401 Md. at 252, 932 A.2d at 590 (discussing the intended scope 
of the federal ERA, and quoting a pro-ERA Senator's remark that discussed the ways 
in which the "tradition and law have worked together to relegate women to an inferior 
status in our society"); Widiss, supra note 6, at 465-68. 
179. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. 
180. See Conaway, 401 Md. at 409, 932 A.2d at 686 (Battaglia, J., dissenting). 
181. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
182. See Wharton, supra note 3, at 1201 n.l. In contrast, Connecticut and New Hampshire, 
two other states that have enacted civil union statutes, do have ERAs. !d. However, 
these statutes were enacted by legislatures on their own, without court mandates. 
POLIKOFF, supra note 8, at 94. This Comment argues that the Conaway majority's 
interpretation of the ERA was incorrect, and that civil unions are unconstitutional 
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the Supreme Court of Vermont did not address any of the plaintiffs' 
constitutional arguments other than the one based on the Common 
Benefits Clause, 183 whereas Maryland's constitution does not have a 
similar clause. 184 A legal rationale for civil unions in Maryland, 
which uses as a guide one of these state's judicial rationales, 185 must 
take into consideration the different constitutional imperatives under 
the Maryland constitution. 
In contrast, Maryland's constitutional imperatives are more similar 
to those of Massachusetts and Hawaii, states which both have 
ERAs. 186 Massachusetts is not only the one state in the country that 
has enacted same-sex marriage, but it has also held that civil unions 
are an unconstitutional alternative to same-sex marriage. 187 While 
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts decided its same-sex 
marriage case, Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 188 on 
grounds other than sex discrimination, it did "refer favorably to sex 
discrimination arguments." 189 The court rejected the idea that the 
institution of marriage should be tied "to the 'optimal' mother and 
father setting for child rearing." 190 Instead, the court stated that "[a]n 
abundance of legislative enactments and decisions . . . negate any 
such stereotypical premises." 191 While same-sex marriage ultimately 
was not enacted in Hawaii, in Baehr v. Lewin, 192 the Hawaii Supreme 
Court invoked the state constitution's ERA in holding that a state 
under the Maryland ERA. It is, therefore, difficult to compare Maryland's 
constitutional imperatives with those of Connecticut and New Hampshire, since their 
high courts did not address the constitutionality of the civil union statutes on ERA 
grounds. 
183. See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 870 n.2 (Vt. 1999). 
184. But cf Conaway, 401 Md. at 327-28, 932 A.2d at 636-37 (Raker, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). Judge Raker found that while the Vermont decision was 
based on the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution, the court-ordered 
remedy of civil unions would be adequate under the Maryland constitution. Id. 
However, she failed to provide a constitutional basis for this conclusion, explaining 
only that Vermont's remedy made "eminent sense." Id. 
185. See supra Part liLA. (discussing New Jersey's and Vermont's legal rationales for civil 
unions). 
186. See Wharton, supra note 3. 
187. See In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 572 (Mass. 2004) 
(holding that the legislature's proposed civil union bill violated the state constitution's 
equal protection and due process requirements). 
188. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
189. See Widiss eta!., supra note 6, at 474 n.60. 
190. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 965 n.28. 
191. /d. 
192. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). 
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statute restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples was subject to 
strict scrutiny because it was sex discrimination. 193 
In comparing Maryland's constitutional imperatives with those of 
Vermont and New Jersey, it is particularly useful to look at New 
Jersey's legal rationale for civil unions, as Judge Raker used this 
reasoning to advocate civil unions in her opinion in Conaway. 194 
While Judge Raker used New Jersey's legal analysis as a rationale for 
civil unions in Maryland, the Supreme Court of New Jersey never 
offered a reason for separating the right of marriage from the right to 
marry. 195 The opinion simply stated that the rights were separate 
ones, without offering any reason as to why they should be 
separated. 196 It seems that 
[b ]ecause the court offer[ ed] no valid basis for this 
distinction under equal protection reasoning other than 
deference to the legislative branch, which it already held 
[was] insufficient to deny same-sex couples the rights and 
benefits in the first place, there is ample room to speculate 
that political factors, such as fear of public reaction, 
influenced the court. 197 
Since there is no constitutional justification for separating these 
rights, the General Assembly should not, solely because of political 
factors, avoid a bill which offers same-sex couples true marriage 
equality. Maryland's constitutional imperatives may not be 
compromised by political fear. 
It is further significant that in offering the legislature the option of 
enacting civil unions over same-sex marriage, the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey stated that it would not "speculate that identical schemes 
called by different names would create a distinction that would 
offend [the state's equal protection clause]. We will not presume that 
193. See id. at 67. Following this decision, Hawaii voters approved a constitutional 
amendment allowing the legislature to restrict marriage to a man and a woman. See 
POLIKOFF, supra note 8, at 91. The legislature gave same-sex couples the option of 
becoming "reciprocal beneficiaries," which provides them with "some of the rights 
and responsibilities afforded married couples, including health-related provisions, 
property rights, inheritance rights, and taxation." /d. at 92. 
194. See supra Part III.B.l. 
195. See Lisa Newstrom, The Horizon of Rights: Lessons from South Africa for the Post-
Goodridge Analysis of Same-Sex Marriage, 40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 781, 802 (2007) 
(criticizing the Supreme Court of New Jersey's decision to offer same-sex couples the 
rights and benefits of marriage, but without the name "marriage" itself). 
196. !d. 
197. /d. 
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a difference in name alone is of constitutional magnitude." 198 The 
results of the first Civil Union Review Commission indicate that a 
"difference in name alone" is an inadequate description of the 
discrimination and unequal treatment faced by same-sex couples in 
civil unions. 199 These results shatter the illusion that civil unions are 
equal to marriage in all respects but name. 200 
Similar to the Supreme Court of New Jersey, the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland failed to provide a constitutional basis to separate the 
rights of marriage from the right to marry.201 Since there is no 
constitutional basis or justification to separate these rights, and since 
the Civil Union Review Commission has so far demonstrated that 
civil unions are not truly equal to marriage,202 New Jersey's 
constitutional analysis should not be followed in Maryland. 
Maryland should instead follow Massachusetts's lead and provide 
same-sex couples with the right to civil marriage. 203 The Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts opined that "the governmental aim of 
[marriage] is to encourage stable adult relationships for the good of 
the individual and of the community, especially its children."204 
Maryland's laws should also provide for the good of all families in 
the community. Judge Raker's opinion is certainly well-intentioned, 
as it advocates civil unions as a means of providing children of same-
sex couples with rights that they are currently denied only because of 
their parents' sexual orientation. 205 However, in creating civil 
unions, a message is conveyed to these. children that they are 
different. 206 After the Massachusetts legislature sought to enact a 
civil union bill, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts pointed 
out that "[i]f ... the proponents of the [civil union] bill believe that 
no message is conveyed by eschewing the word 'marriage' and 
replacing it with 'civil union' for same-sex 'spouses,' we doubt that 
the attempt to circumvent the court's decision in Goodridge would be 
198. Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196,221-22 (N.J. 2006). 
199. See supra Part III.B.2.a. 
200. See id. 
201. See Conaway v. Deane, 401 Md. 219, 326, 932 A.2d 571, 635-36 (2007) (Raker, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Raker simply stated that the New 
Jersey court distinguished between the two rights, and that she would analyze the 
issue the same way. !d. No constitutional basis or justification for separating these 
rights was offered. See id. 
202. See supra Part III.B.2.a. 
203. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969-70 (Mass. 2003). 
204. In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 569 (2004). 
205. See supra Part III.B.l.b. 
206. N.J. CIVIL UNION REVIEwCOMM'N, supra note 144, at 11-12. 
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so purposeful."207 The General Assembly should follow the lead of 
Massachusetts and enact civil marriage because of both the 
constitutional imperatives of the ERA and the important public policy 
of encouraging the stability of all families in the community. 208 
V. CONCLUSION 
Maryland is on the brink of becoming the next state to embrace full 
marriage equality for all people, regardless of sexual orientation. The 
General Assembly should enact a civil marriage bill rather than a 
civil union bill because civil unions are unconstitutional sex 
discrimination. 209 In holding that Family Law § 2-201 was not sex 
discrimination under the ERA, 210 the Conaway court misinterpreted 
the ERA's meaning and purpose. 211 Maryland cannot continue to 
subscribe to a marriage system which is based on traditional and 
stereotypical gender roles. 212 Further, Maryland should not expand 
the flaws in our currently unconstitutional marriage system, and 
relegate certain couples to the second-class status of civil unions. 
Civil unions are not only unconstitutional, but they will also cause the 
state unnecessary financial and administrative hardships that could be 
easily avoided by providing same-sex couples with the right to civil 
marriage. 213 The ERA demands that the General Assembly enact a 
civil marriage bill that does not discriminate on the basis of sex. 214 
The General Assembly should not subscribe to the illusory belief that 
the difference between civil unions and marriage is only one of 
semantics, thereby avoiding a bill that provides full marriage equality 
to all Maryland residents. 
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